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S ince 1987, the United States Supreme Court has announced a se-
ries of opinions granting greater protection to private property
owners. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles,' the Court formalized the requirement that "just com-
pensation" be paid upon a judicial finding of a regulatory taking. In
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,2 the Court found a taking
where a government agency had attached a condition to the grant of a
development permit that was insufficiently related to the asserted gov-
ernment purpose. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,3 the
Court affirmed a so-called "categorical" test for regulatory takings
guaranteeing owners economically viable use of their property. Most
recently, in Dolan v. City of Tigard,4 the Court added flesh to the
bones of Nollan through standards requiring "essential nexus" and
"rough proportionality" when government imposes conditions on de-
velopment permits.
This steady march of judicial decisions favoring property owners
has led some prognosticators to predict, and some property rights ad-
vocates to hope, that the next judicial shoe to drop will overturn or
greatly limit Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,' the
landmark opinion upon which so much modem-day federal and state
court Takings Clause jurisprudence relies. In Penn Central, the Court
upheld,6 facially and as applied, New York City's Landmarks Preser-
vation Law.' Prognostication and hope are no substitutes for analysis,
however. Neither the holdings nor the rationales of the Court's recent
takings jurisprudence support an opinion that Penn Central's days are
legally numbered.
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I. THE PENN CENTRAL DECISION
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court reached two basic conclusions.
First, the Court determined that landmarks preservation laws substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests because historic preservation
enhances the quality of life in urban neighborhoods.8 Second, the
Court found that the City's landmarks law, as applied to Grand Cen-
tral Terminal, did not violate what may be termed the "economic"
component of the Takings Clause. The Court formulated a three-fac-
tor inquiry to determine whether government regulation has effected
a taking, requiring case-by-case consideration of the (1) economic im-
pact on the claimant, (2) effect on his or her distinct investment-
backed expectations, and (3) character of the governmental action,
such as whether or not it authorizes a physical invasion.9
Focusing on the first two factors of this inquiry, the Penn Central
Court noted three salient facts. First, in what hindsight suggests was a
strategic blunder, Penn Central had conceded that it earned a reason-
able financial return on its investment.'0 Second, the Court cited the
possibility of gaining economic benefit by transferring the unused de-
velopment rights above the Terminal to surrounding parcels owned by
Penn Central." Third, the Court observed that Penn Central's pri-
mary investment-backed expectation had been to operate Grand Cen-
tral Terminal, not to build an office building above it-an expectation
that remained undisturbed by the landmarks law.' 2 Accordingly, the
Penn Central Court held that New York City's landmarks law did not
violate the Takings Clause.13
II. THE A GINS GLOSS
Several years after Penn Central, the Court announced its decision
in Agins v. City of Tiburon,'4 which provided a slightly different lin-
guistic formulation for evaluating regulations under the Takings
Clause. Unlike Penn Central's three-factor inquiry, the Agins formu-
lation is a two-prong disjunctive test. It provides that a regulation ef-
fects a taking if it (1) does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests, or (2) denies an owner economically viable use of his or her
property.' 5
How do these two tests relate to one another? One interpretation
is that the Agins two-prong disjunctive test is an outcome-determina-
tive recapitulation of the Penn Central three-factor inquiry. Under
8. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 108, 129.
9. Id at 124.
10. Id. at 129, 136.
11. Id. at 137.
12. Id. at 136.
13. Id.
14. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
15. Id. at 260.
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this view, Agins clarifies how much economic impact and effect upon
distinct investment-backed expectations are necessary to transgress
the constitutional line. Simply put, if the property owner has been
deprived of economically viable use, there has been a taking; if eco-
nomically viable use remains, then there has not been a taking. A
variant of this interpretation is that Agins confirms the constitutional
minimum of economically viable use, but leaves open the issue of
what happens when there is not a denial of economically viable use.
Under either interpretation, however, Agins fails to define exactly
what is meant by economically viable use,' 6 an oversight rectified to
some extent twelve years later in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council. 7 Throughout the 1980s, the Penn Central three-factor in-
quiry and the Agins two-prong disjunctive test were repeatedly and
interchangeably cited, mantra-like, in literally thousands of federal
and state court cases.
III. TiH LucAs CONFIRMATION
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,18 the Court essentially
approved the Agins outcome-determinative interpretation of Penn
Central by holding that a denial of all economically viable, beneficial,
productive or feasible use constitutes a categorical taking.'9 If the
challenged regulation leaves some economically viable use, which in
the Lucas context means some use producing a value greater than
zero,20 Lucas directs the analysis to the impressionistic, ad hoc, no-set-
formula Penn Central economic inquiry, under which a court is to ex-
amine the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, as well
as the impact upon his or her distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions.21 Lucas effectively provides the property owner with two bites
at the economic apple.
Lucas additionally endorses Penn Central's view that the characteri-
zation of a regulation as preventing harm rather than promoting bene-
fit is linguistic gamesmanship incapable of yielding a defensible
takings jurisprudence. 22 Ironically, landmark designation is most vul-
16. For example, the definition of economically viable use depends on whether it
is determined from the point of view of a property's actual owner or from the point of
view of an arm's-length market investor.
17. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
18. Id.
19. Lucas adds the word "all," as well as the adjectives "beneficial," "productive,"
and "feasible" to the test. Id. at 2893, 2899.
20. Id. at 2895 & n.8.
21. Id. at 2893, 2895 n.8.
22. Id. at 2898 nn.11-12; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133-34 n.30. Note also that
while Justice Stevens accused the Lucas majority of neglecting the "most important
factor in takings analysis: the character of the government action," Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2922-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting), this factor was, in fact, addressed by the majority in
its discussion of physical invasions. ld. at 2893. Penn Central's paradigm of this factor
was also physical invasions. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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nerable when analyzed under a constitutional regime that gives
credence to the distinction between regulations that prevent classic
harms or nuisances, and regulations that secure public benefits.23
Thus, in Lucas, Penn Central was not only cited, but burnished.
However, Lucas does draw into question one frequently cited as-
pect of Penn Central-the so-called "parcel as a whole" rule. In Penn
Central, the majority suggested that in assessing a regulation's impact,
the constitutional inquiry should focus on the entire parcel, and not
simply on that part of the parcel specifically restricted by the chal-
lenged regulation.24 Penn Central argued that 100% of its air rights
above Grand Central Terminal had been taken, effectively describing
a complete elimination of economic value similar to the Lucas cate-
gorical taking.25 New York City countered that, correctly viewed, the
parcel included not only the air rights above the terminal, but also the
terminal itself. The Penn Central majority agreed with the City26 over
a dissent by Justice Rehnquist.27 In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis,28 the Court approved Penn Central's parcel as a
whole rule,29 again over a dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist.3 °
In Lucas, the majority revisited this issue, implying a greater will-
ingness to focus on the restricted part of the parcel-a position that
would necessarily make it easier for property owners to claim a cate-
gorical taking.3' Although the Supreme Court rejected this view in
Concrete Pipe & Products, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust,3 2 it has since been championed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States.3
3
23. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258
Cal. Rptr. 893, 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (suggesting, on remand from the United
States Supreme Court, a hierarchy of legitimate state interests with health and safety
at the top).
24. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.
25. Id at 130.
26. Id. at 130-31.
27. Id. at 138.
28. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
29. Id. at 496-501.
30. Id at 506, 515-18.
31. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. The Court stated:
[w]hen, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a
rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the
situation as one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically
viable use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner
has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.
Id.
32. 113 S. Ct. 2264, 2290 (1993) ("To the extent that any portion of property is
taken, that portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is
whether the property taken is all, or only a portion of the parcel in question.").
33. 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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IV. LINGERING QUESTIONS
The other significant post-Penn Central Takings Clause opinions,
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission34 and Dolan v. City of
Tigard,3s embroider the "substantially advance legitimate state inter-
ests" prong articulated by Agins, in the context of conditions on build-
ing permits. Taking the Agins linguistic formulation at face value, it is
undeniable that landmarks law in general, and designation of
landmark buildings in particular, substantially advance the legitimate
state interest of historic preservation. Even the claimant, Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co., in Penn Central conceded that the preserva-
tion of buildings "is an entirely permissible goal ... [and that] the
restrictions imposed [on landmarks] are appropriate means of secur-
ing the purposes" of the law. 36
Nollan and Dolan, however, delve more deeply than do previous
cases into the justifications underlying burdens imposed by the gov-
ernment on individual property owners. For example, in Nollan, the
Court failed to discern any connection between the California Coastal
Commission's asserted goals and the lateral beach access condition.37
In Dolan, the Court concluded that the City of Tigard had not suffi-
ciently demonstrated that the exacted greenway and bicycle path
would mitigate the negative flooding and traffic impacts of Mrs. Do-
lan's proposed store expansion in a roughly proportionate fashion.38
The Dolan Court suggested that the evidentiary burden for justifying
governmental actions is on the government when actions are "adjudi-
cative" rather than "legislative" in nature.39
Should this increased judicial concern about government actions
that selectively burden individual property owners undermine the
designation of individual landmark buildings, especially when con-
trasted with the designation of historic districts? In one way,
landmark designation axiomatically answers why particular property
owners should have to bear the burdens associated with historic pres-
ervation. Landmark laws specifically target the negative impacts re-
sulting from alteration or demolition of a designated landmark.
Furthermore, individual designations may secure for the burdened
property owner what Justice Holmes dubbed "average reciprocity of
advantage"4 when understood as part of a comprehensive program of
historic preservation. The Penn Central majority cited the sweep of
34. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
35. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
36. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978). The Court found New York's
landmarks ordinance to be "reasonably related to the promotion of the general wel-
fare." Id. at 131.
37. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838-39.
38. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321-22.
39. Id. at 2320 n.8.
40. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
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New York City's landmarks program, which included more than 400
individual landmarks and thirty-one historic districts at that time, to
conclude that the City's approach reflected a "comprehensive" plan.4'
CONCLUSION
For seventeen years, Penn Central has remained the most promi-
nent and complete constitutional statement from the United States
Supreme Court on the meaning of the Takings Clause. Later cases,
such as First English, Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan, have confirmed and
elaborated upon its basic analytical approach, but have never contra-
dicted it. That landowners have recently turned to federal and state
legislatures-a statutory, rather than constitutional avenue-to se-
cure heightened protection for property rights merely underscores the
enduring constitutional legacy of Penn Central and the improbability
that future opinions from the Supreme Court will deviate greatly from
this pillar of Takings Clause jurisprudence. At least in the judicial
branch, historic preservation efforts and the existing balance between
government regulation and private property rights will likely continue
to enjoy approval.
41. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 134. Justice Rehnquist disagreed with this conclu-
sion in his dissent. Id. at 138 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
